



MUNES

26

STUDY GUIDE

**HJCC
(AFGHAN)**

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Letter from the Secretariat

2. Letter from the Crisis Team

3. Letter from the Chairboard

3.1. Letter from the USG

3.2. Letter from the Cabinet Chair

4. Introduction

4.1. Historical Background

4.2. Operation Storm 333 and the installment of a Puppet Regime

4.3. Direct Soviet Intervention into Afghan Lands

5. Structure of the Committee

5.1. Peshawar Seven

5.2. Tehran Eight

6. Key Historical Figures

6.1. Ahmad Shah Massoud

6.2. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar

6.3. Abdul Rasul Sayyaf 6.4.

Other Notable Leaders

7. Bibliography

SOVIET-AFGHAN WAR (AFGHAN)

1. Letter from the Secretariat

Dear Delegates,

As Eskişehir's first and only official MUN, it gives me great pleasure to welcome you to MUNES'26, a historic Model UN Conference. This conference is a special opportunity to promote cooperation, critical thinking, and diplomacy among young people in our city and beyond. In order to ensure that every aspect of this conference reflects excellence, dedication, and a commitment to providing a truly transformative experience, the Academy has brought together the most gifted students from all management teams of local MUNs. The Eskişehir Municipality and Governorship, along with the prestigious companies that have supported this event, are proud to support MUNES'26. Their contributions and trust demonstrate the importance of MUNES as a catalyst for civic engagement, youth leadership, and the advancement of global awareness in Eskişehir. We really care about setting the rules for talking working together and cooperating with other countries as the only Model United Nations that represents our city. We are the Model United Nations for our city and we want to make sure we do a good job of discussing things and working with other people from different countries. We think it is very important to have discussions, diplomacy and international collaboration as the Model United Nations, for our city. This conference is an opportunity for you to think like world leaders. You get to discuss problems that affect the whole world and come up with new ideas to solve them. As a delegate you are representing the country you were assigned to. You also need to show that you can work well with others respect each other and understand points of view which is what the United Nations is all about. I want each of you to take part fully in your committees. Listen to what other people have to say even if you do not agree with them.. When things get tough be brave and curious and try to find a way to make it work. The United Nations is, about people working together so let us make that happen at this conference. I want to wish every delegate the best of luck during their sessions on behalf of the organizing team. I hope your discussions are enlightening, your partnerships fruitful, and your MUNES'26 experiences motivating. Let this conference be a journey of self-improvement, deep connections, and a long-term dedication to changing the world and your communities for the better.

Best regards,

Çağlar Baran Topaç - Secretary General

2. Letter from the Crisis Team

Dear Delegates,

As a Crisis Committee, this simulation will be fast-paced and highly dynamic. Events will unfold in real time, and your directives will directly shape the trajectory of the war and its aftermath. Expect military developments, intelligence leaks, political instability, regional interference, and humanitarian crises. Delegates must balance short-term tactical gains with long-term strategic consequences.

Best of luck :) ~~don't make any mistakes or we will eat your directives:)~~

3. Letter from the Chairboard

3.1. Letter from the USG

Distinguished Delegates,

It is with great joy and excitement that I welcome you to MUNES'26. I am Efe Enes Kılıç, and I am honored to be serving as your Under-Secretary-General for this conference. Whether you are attending a crisis committee for the first time or you are an experienced delegate, I want you to feel at home here. Crisis committees are unlike any other committee experience; they are fast, unpredictable, and will push you to think on your feet. New situations will arise when you least expect them, and it will be up to you to adapt and find solutions under pressure. It won't always be easy, but I promise it will be worth it. A conference like this takes a lot of hard work and dedication to put together. I want to sincerely thank our entire Secretariat team for everything they have done to make this happen. I also want to thank our chairs and crisis staff who will be working hard behind the scenes to challenge you and guide you throughout the committee. To our delegates, be bold, stay sharp, and don't panic when a crisis hits. Think clearly, work together, and trust yourself. These next few days will test you in the best way possible, and I am confident that each and every one of you will rise to the occasion. I can't wait to see how you handle what's coming.

Welcome to MUNES'26.

Efe Enes Kılıç Under-Secretary-General / HJCC

3.2. Letter from the Cabinet Chair

Dear Delegates,

My name is Duru Ada Demirel, and I will be attending this conference as the Chair of the Afghan Cabinet. First of all, I hope you have all come prepared by reading the study guide and researching the conflict. Secondly, I expect active participation from all of you; please do not hesitate to ask any questions any time! Thirdly, it is completely normal to feel nervous, and I am a bit nervous as well! I wish you all an enjoyable conference!!!

Duru Ada Demirel - H-JCC / Afghan Cabinet Chair

4. Introduction

The rivalry between the US and the USSR dominated the international system in the decades that followed the end of World War II. The Cold War was a period of global struggles for influence, ideology, and strategic superiority rather than a direct conflict between the two superpowers. Both powers backed their allies, funded proxy forces, and intervened militarily and politically in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East to sway the post-World War II international order in their favor. However, Afghanistan became a new and unstable arena in this rivalry in the late 1970s. Afghanistan was a region of incalculable geopolitical significance, situated at the meeting point of the Middle East, South Asia, and Central Asia. As a border nation to the Soviet Union's southern republics, it provided a buffer against instability and Western encroachment. It was an opportunity for the US to prevent Soviet expansion and stop communism from spreading throughout the area.

4.1. Historical Background

The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) officially split into two rival groups in 1967: Babrak Karmal's Parcham and Nur Muhammad Taraki's Khalq. Strong ideological and personal animosities persisted despite the factions' brief reunion prior to the Saur Revolution in April 1978. Following the 1978 Saur Revolution, the PDPA seized power and implemented radical socialist reforms, including the redistribution of land, policies promoting secularization, the expansion of women's rights, and initiatives to weaken the influence of religion and tribes. The conservative, tribal, and rural social fabric of Afghanistan was largely ignored as these reforms were implemented quickly and frequently under duress. As a result, there were widespread disruptions in the countryside, including Islamist resistance, rural insurgencies, and tribal uprisings. At the same time, internal factional divisions within the PDPA started to occur once more. Even if it meant widespread repression, the Khalq faction, which controlled Taraki's early revolutionary government, fought for swift and unreserved revolutionary change. In contrast, the Parcham faction favored a more gradual and politically calibrated approach to change, emphasizing institutional strengthening and alliance building over an immediate revolution. With the death of a prominent PDPA member, Mir Akbar Khyber, and the persecution of PDPA by Daoud's government and rival groups. Khyber's unknown death sparked anti-Daoud demonstrations in Kabul, which led to the arrest of multiple PDPA members and popular PDPA leaders. On the morning of April 27, 1978, Daoud and his family were overthrown and put to death by the Afghan Army, who had strong sympathies for the PDPA. The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) was established as a result of these events. The Soviet Union and the newly formed Afghan State signed a Friendship Pact on December 5th of that year.

4.2. Operation Storm 333 and the installment of a Puppet Regime

After the Khalq faction of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) consolidated its power, Hafizullah Amin's leadership was forced to rely on Soviet assistance to maintain control over the worsening domestic situation. In December 1978, the Soviet Union and the Afghan revolutionary government had already signed an agreement formalizing economic assistance and military cooperation. Theoretically, these accords were meant to strengthen the Afghan state's socialist transition. But in actuality, they marked the beginning of the Soviet Union's larger engagement in Afghan politics. Amin repeatedly demanded the arrival of Soviet troops during the spring and summer of 1979. Officially, these troops were to safeguard vital infrastructure, train Afghan military forces, and help quell the rising insurgency led by Islamist and tribal militants commonly known as the mujahideen. However, the reality on the ground indicated that the situation was not merely a military crisis. The revolutionary policies of the Khalq-led government, including land redistribution, the elimination of religious leaders, and the swift pace of political purges, had alienated significant numbers of the Afghan people. Instead of solidifying their power base, the government's policies fueled rebellion in the countryside and even within the ranks of the military. The initial hesitations of the Moscow government to intervene directly in Afghanistan was a reflection of their concerns that troops on the ground might turn a friendly socialist neighbor into a potential geopolitical problem. The concerns were supported by reports from the KGB station in Kabul. The intelligence agents had indicated that the leadership style of Amin was extremely repressive and unpredictable. His consolidation of power had already begun with the overthrow and execution of his former ally, Nur Muhammad Taraki, which came as a shock to many in the Moscow government who had previously considered Taraki a reliable ideological ally. After his consolidation of power, Amin began a series of purges aimed at removing his enemies and those who were considered to be disloyal to his regime within the party, the military, and the state apparatus. Although purges were not unusual in revolutionary regimes, what was disturbing to Soviet leaders was the scope and character of these measures. A number of people who were removed from power had strong connections with Soviet advisors or had been trained in Soviet institutions. At the same time, Soviet experts began to wonder if Amin might be considering other options for diplomatic engagement that were outside the reach of Soviet influence. Rumors began to circulate that Amin was trying to initiate communication with the United States and with the government of Pakistan, both of which had important strategic interests in the future of Afghanistan's government. Even the mere possibility of communication with these countries caused consternation within the Soviet leadership, which regarded Afghanistan as a vital buffer zone between Soviet territory and the southern border of the Soviet Union during the Cold War era. Of particular concern to the Soviet leadership was the relationship between Amin and American diplomatic representatives in Kabul. Among these was J. Bruce Amstutz, who was the U.S. Chief of Mission at the time. While the meetings between Amin and American representatives were seen in Moscow as more than just normal diplomatic engagement, they could also be taken as a possible indication that Amin was trying to play off the superpowers or even change the alignment of Afghanistan. Whether or not this was a valid concern is a matter of historical interpretation, but it certainly contributed to the Soviet perception of Amin as a strategic threat. However, by late 1979, the Soviet leadership was

confronted with a tough decision. On the one hand, the instability in Afghanistan posed a threat to the survival of a socialist government on their immediate border, which would undermine Soviet credibility in the global Cold War struggle. On the other hand, it seemed that Amin himself was contributing to the instability rather than stabilizing it. His repressive internal policies, purges, and foreign policy intentions made many Soviet leaders believe that it would not be sufficient to merely support Amin's government. With the escalation of insurgent actions and the waning of government control in Afghanistan, the question of intervention in Afghanistan began to shift from whether to how in the Soviet Union. The Soviet leadership began to question the ability of Hafizullah Amin to hold the country together and even considered replacing him with a more trustworthy ally in the Afghan capital of Kabul. Such a change in thinking contributed to the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan later in 1979. Operation Storm-333 was the assault carried out by the Soviet special forces that led to the direct military intervention of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan on 27 December 1979. Soviet commandos, paratroopers, and KGB agents conducted a coordinated attack on the Tajbeg Palace in Kabul to eliminate the Afghan leader Hafizullah Amin, who was deemed unreliable and responsible for destabilizing the country by the Soviet government. In the course of the attack, Amin was killed, and the key government and military installations in the capital were quickly seized by the Soviet forces. This was immediately followed by the installation of Babrak Karmal, a leader of the Parcham faction of the PDPA who had been in exile, as the head of the Afghan government, thus establishing a regime that was highly dependent on Soviet political and military support.

4.3. Direct Soviet Intervention into Afghan Lands

Following the deployment and initial operations of the 40th Army, the military presence of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan quickly escalated to a large-scale occupation and counter-insurgency effort. The 40th Army was assigned with the responsibility of securing the major population centers, safeguarding the newly installed government in the capital city of Kabul, and maintaining control over the strategic highways, airfields, and logistical routes that linked the Soviet supply lines from Central Asia into Afghanistan. The Soviet military also sought to rebuild the Afghan government forces. The Soviet military commanders thought that securing the cities and lines of communication would enable the Afghan government to regain control of the countryside. But the resistance spread rapidly in rural areas, tribal zones, and mountainous regions, where the insurgents could avoid direct engagement with the military and opt for guerrilla warfare. The mujahideen fighters launched ambushes on convoys, sabotage attacks on infrastructure, and hit-and-run attacks on Soviet and Afghan military installations, often melting into the local population or falling back into areas where conventional warfare would be less effective. The mission of the 40th Army changed from a short-term stabilization mission to a long-term military campaign to weaken the insurgent groups. The Soviet military started large-scale search and destroy missions in the contested provinces, employing armored forces, airborne troops, and helicopter-borne assaults to attack suspected rebel-held areas. Airpower was extensively used, with regular bombing and close air support to weaken the insurgent supply lines and bases. However, the insurgent groups were quick to adjust to the new situation and spread their forces to continue

attacking the Soviet-held areas. On the other hand, the Soviet military was also facing some serious logistical and political challenges. The Soviet military was finding it very difficult to maintain such a large expeditionary force so far away from the Soviet mainland, and it was also very difficult for them to coordinate their efforts with the Afghan military forces. Moreover, the conflict was also gaining international attention, and some foreign countries were supporting the insurgent groups opposing the Soviet-backed government. The war had escalated into a costly and grinding struggle in which the Soviet forces were in control of many cities and major roads, but were finding it difficult to establish control over the countryside. The 40th Army continued to be actively engaged in the war, with rotations of troops, reinforcement of garrisons, and efforts to contain the insurgency in various regions. Rather than the rapid stabilization that the Soviet leadership had anticipated, the intervention had escalated into a costly conflict that had significantly impacted the course of the war in Afghanistan.

5. Structure of the Committee

5.1. Peshawar Seven

Based in Peshawar, Pakistan, the Peshawar Seven was a coalition of seven major Sunni Mujahideen parties. The Sunni Afghan resistance's primary political front was this coalition. From Peshawar, the organizations oversaw military operations, disbursed money and weapons, and represented the Afghan resistance abroad. The United States, Pakistan, and a number of Middle Eastern nations that opposed the Soviet presence in Afghanistan provided these organizations with substantial support.

5.2. Tehran Eight

Eight primarily Shia Mujahideen factions formed the Tehran Eight, an independent alliance. Iran's Tehran organized and provided support for these organizations. The Hazara people of central Afghanistan made up a large portion of this alliance's fighters, and the majority of their activities took place there. The Tehran Eight, like the Peshawar Seven, coordinated resistance activities and received financial and logistical support from their foreign backers, acting as a military and political alliance.

6. Key Historical Figures

6.1. Ahmad Shah Massoud


Ahmad Shah Massoud, a figure of immense respect, led the Afghan resistance during the Soviet–Afghan War. Known as the "Lion of Panjshir," his reputation extended beyond military prowess; he was also recognized for his composed leadership and his deep bond with the people of the Panjshir Valley. Unlike many of his contemporaries, who relied solely on brute force, Massoud prioritized community organization, the establishment of local governance, and the maintenance of discipline within his ranks. Throughout the conflict, he employed guerrilla warfare and his intimate understanding of the rugged landscape to confront the Soviet Union's far superior numbers. Despite repeated Soviet offensives aimed at his stronghold, he consistently endured, rebuilding his forces after each assault. His leadership style, a blend of strategy, patience, and the ability to foster loyalty among both civilians and combatants, solidified his status as one of the most revered figures within the Afghan resistance.



6.2. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a figure of considerable influence and contention, emerged as a leading force among the Afghan Mujahideen during the conflict. He established Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, a substantial and well-structured resistance movement that operated from Peshawar, Pakistan. His faction became a principal player in the struggle against Soviet and Afghan government forces. Hekmatyar was driven by a profound ideological commitment, intent on molding Afghanistan's future in accordance with his vision of an Islamic state. His troops regularly conducted guerrilla operations and launched rocket attacks against government installations and supply lines.

Because his organization received significant foreign support, he commanded one of the largest and best-supplied Mujahideen factions. However, his intense political rivalries with other resistance leaders often created divisions within the broader Afghan resistance movement.



6.3. Abdul Rasul Sayyaf

Abdul Rasul Sayyaf was a prominent Afghan Mujahideen leader during the Soviet–Afghan War and the founder of the resistance faction Ittehad-e Islami. Operating mainly from bases in Peshawar in Pakistan, he became an influential figure among the Sunni resistance groups fighting against Soviet and Afghan government forces in Afghanistan. Sayyaf was known for his strong Islamist ideology and his ability to build connections with foreign supporters. During the war, Sayyaf played an important role in organizing fighters and coordinating military activities against Soviet-backed forces. His faction participated in guerrilla operations, attacks on military positions, and efforts to disrupt government control in contested regions. Sayyaf was also known for maintaining close relations with Arab supporters and volunteers who came to Afghanistan to join the jihad against the Soviet presence. Through these international connections and his political influence within the resistance alliances, he became a notable figure within the broader Mujahideen movement during the conflict.



6.4. Other Notable Leaders

1. Ismail Khan

Ismail Khan was one of the most important regional commanders of the Afghan resistance during the Soviet–Afghan War, especially in western Afghanistan. Before the conflict, he served as an officer in the Afghan army, but after the communist government came to power he joined the Mujahideen and quickly became a leading figure in the resistance around Herat. His military experience and strong local connections helped him organize fighters and build support among the population in the region. During the war, Ismail Khan led guerrilla attacks against Soviet and Afghan government forces, targeting military convoys, bases, and supply routes. He was known for his determination and his close relationship with the communities that supported his fighters. Many people in western Afghanistan saw him not only as a military commander but also as a local leader who defended their region during the conflict. Because of his ability to organize resistance and maintain influence in a difficult and contested area, Ismail Khan became one of the most respected Mujahideen commanders in the western part of the country.



2. Jalaluddin Haqqani

Jalaluddin Haqqani was a well-known Mujahideen commander during the Soviet–Afghan War, operating mainly in eastern Afghanistan near the border with Pakistan. Over time, he gained a reputation as a capable battlefield leader who could organize fighters and carry out coordinated attacks against Soviet and Afghan government forces. His leadership style relied heavily on personal connections with local tribes and communities, which helped him build a loyal network of supporters and fighters. During the conflict, Haqqani's forces frequently carried out guerrilla operations such as ambushes on military convoys, raids on government positions, and attacks on supply routes. His ability to operate in the rugged mountainous terrain of eastern Afghanistan made his group particularly difficult for Soviet forces to eliminate. Because of his battlefield effectiveness and strong local alliances, Haqqani became one of the more influential commanders within the Mujahideen resistance during the war.




3. Abdul Ali Mazari

Abdul Ali Mazari was an important Afghan political and resistance figure who represented many members of the Hazara community during the years of conflict in Afghanistan. Emerging as a leader among Shia resistance groups, he became known for organizing fighters and political supporters in the central regions of the country, particularly in areas where the Hazara population was concentrated. During the Soviet–Afghan War, Mazari helped coordinate resistance efforts among Shia Mujahideen factions that operated separately from the Sunni alliances based in Peshawar. These groups were generally connected to networks supported from Tehran, and they focused on defending their local communities while resisting Soviet-backed government forces. Mazari was known for his ability to unite different factions and for his emphasis on political representation for marginalized groups. His leadership and advocacy made him an influential voice among the Shia resistance movements during the conflict.




4. Burhanuddin Rabbani

Burhanuddin Rabbani, a former professor of Islamic theology, he became the head of Jamiat-e Islami, one of the major Mujahideen organizations fighting against Soviet-backed forces in Afghanistan. From bases in Peshawar, Rabbani worked to organize political coordination among resistance groups and to represent the Afghan Mujahideen in international discussions. Rather than acting mainly as a battlefield commander, Rabbani played a key role in guiding the political direction of the resistance movement. He supported commanders such as Ahmad Shah Massoud, whose forces operated under the broader network of Jamiat-e Islami. Rabbani focused on building alliances, organizing leadership structures, and maintaining unity within parts of the resistance. His combination of religious scholarship and political leadership helped him become one of the most influential figures shaping the Mujahideen movement during the war.



5. Hamid Gul

Hamid Gul, a senior military officer in Pakistan, serving as a leading officer within Pakistan's intelligence services, he played a role in coordinating assistance to Mujahideen groups fighting against Soviet and Afghan government forces in Afghanistan. His position placed him at the center of efforts to organize training, logistics, and the distribution of aid to resistance factions. Through Pakistan's strategic involvement in the conflict, Gul became closely connected with several Mujahideen leaders and resistance organizations operating from Peshawar, which served as a major base for Afghan resistance activities. By helping facilitate cooperation between foreign supporters and Afghan fighters, Gul played an important role in the broader international dimension of the war, even though he was not directly commanding forces on the battlefield.




6. Osama bin Laden Osama bin Laden was a Saudi-born volunteer and financier who became involved in the Soviet-Afghan War by supporting the Mujahideen against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. While not a battlefield commander of the Afghan factions, he helped organize Arab volunteers, provided funding, and facilitated logistical support for foreign fighters who joined the jihad. Bin Laden became known for his ability to recruit fighters and coordinate their movement into Afghanistan, creating a network of international volunteers who contributed to the resistance



effort. Operating mainly in the eastern regions of Afghanistan and along the border with Pakistan, bin Laden worked alongside local Mujahideen groups and sometimes assisted in planning operations. Though his personal influence on the Afghan battlefield was limited compared to local commanders, his role in mobilizing foreign fighters and directing resources helped strengthen the international dimension of the resistance. His activities during this war laid the groundwork for the networks that would later become central to global jihadist movements.

7. Gust Avrakotos

Gust Avrakotos, a CIA officer who played a key role in organizing and directing American support for the Afghan resistance during the Soviet–Afghan War. He was heavily involved in Operation Cyclone, the U.S. program that supplied weapons, funding, and training to Mujahideen groups fighting against Soviet and Afghan government forces in Afghanistan. Avrakotos became known for his hands-on approach, often working directly with resistance leaders and foreign intermediaries to ensure aid reached the frontlines efficiently.



Unlike some of the Afghan commanders, Avrakotos did not fight on the battlefield himself, but his strategic coordination and knowledge of the Mujahideen landscape made him an influential figure behind the scenes. He helped prioritize support to the most effective resistance groups, facilitated the flow of supplies through Pakistan, and advised policymakers on which factions could have the greatest impact against Soviet forces. His work was crucial in maintaining the logistics and international support network that sustained the Afghan resistance throughout the war.

7. Bibliography

<https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/history/soviet-war-afghanistan>

<https://www.britannica.com/event/Soviet-invasion-of-Afghanistan>

<https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/soviet-invasion-afghanistan>